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Introduction 
The Bush Administration’s perceptions of the Iraq War bring to mind Plato’s Allegory of the Cave 
in The Republic. Nothing illustrates this more than the shadows and echoes brought before 
Congress in September by General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker. Their 
shadow play, whether intentional or not, fails to convey a picture of Iraq that can move us toward 
stability and (relative) peace. 
What was missing from the performance, and indeed from nearly all reflections about Iraq, are 
two key variables: the scale and effect of the violence that continues to ravage the country, and 
the role of the neighbors in promoting or stemming violence and instability. 
The Iraq Study Group’s report of late 2006 had recommended regional discussions to move 
toward a solution to the mounting, multipolar violence in Iraq. At the time, the Bush Administration 
seemed to completely dismiss the ISG’s views, opting instead for the troop surge and 
benchmarks strategy that, by most independent estimates, has had mixed results at best.[1] 
Diplomacy remains low on the list of priorities, and the few contacts with neighboring states have 
been unproductive, indifferent, or hostile. Petraeus and Crocker’s appearances on Capitol Hill 
brace the Administration’s tendencies to favor military action over diplomacy—a fraying, old script.  
Violence and the Neighbors 
On the role of the neighbors, for example, notable attention is given to Iran, but few others. The 
activities of Iran in the war, moreover, have the look of a felony indictment rather than an overall 
assessment. That is, Petraeus and others in the Multi-National Force command have made 
allegations about weapons coming in from Iran to be used by militias against U.S. troops. “It is 
increasingly apparent,” Petraeus told Congress, “to both coalition and Iraqi leaders that Iran, 
through the use of the Qods Force, seeks to turn the Iraqi Special Groups into a Hezbollah-like 
force to serve its interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in 
Iraq.”[2] In the same appearance, Ambassador Crocker, U.S. envoy to Iraq since March 2007, 
echoed Petraeus’ comment and offered little in the way of other regional actors offering concrete 
ideas or steps to stabilize Iraq. 
Among the maps Petraeus displayed at the hearings was one, “Major Threats to Iraq,” 
purportedly showing the sources of violence in Iraq. Nearly all identified sources had to do with 
Iran or their supposed proxies. And all violent actors coming from outside Iraq originate in Syria or 
Iran. But as Ahmed Hashim, among others, has described in his Insurgency and Counter-
insurgency in Iraq, that among those violently fighting the U.S. military and the Iraqi state, “the 
foreign element is miniscule.” To the extent there is a foreign element, he describes a first wave 
to be Palestinians from refugee camps, and a second, larger wave of “mostly Islamic militants 
recruited throughout Europe and the Middle East and then sent to Iraq through the same 
elaborate human pipeline the mujahideen used to send volunteers to the Balkans, Chechnya, and 
Afghanistan.” Hashim has noted that a high percentage of foreign fighters caught in Iraq are from 
Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries apart from Syria, a calculation reflected broadly in other 
empirical accounts.[3] Nor have the repeated attempts to link Iran to supply of weapons to 
insurgents to kill American soldiers, particularly roadside bombs or IEDs, been convincing.[4] 
None of this is reflected in Petraeus’ or Crocker’s assertions, or those of their superiors in the U.S. 
Government. What we do see in Administration depictions of the war is a broad and persistent 
misperception of a chaotic battle environment and chaotic policy processes. “The fundamental 
source of the conflict in Iraq is competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power 
and resources,” Petraeus argued in his testimony. “Foreign and home-grown terrorists, insurgents, 
militia extremists, and criminals all push the ethno-sectarian competition toward violence. Malign 
actions by Syria and, especially, by Iran fuel that violence.”[5] 
The violence is significantly blamed on outsiders—Iran, Syria, and Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia 
(another dimly glimpsed force)—rather than on ungrateful, bumptious Iraqis themselves, who are 
merely engaging in competition for power and resources, or on the coalition forces, a topic 
discussed below. But these broad depictions of foreign influence make it seem as though the 
principal activity of the neighbors is to attack Americans and supply the intramural “competition,” 
which by nearly every independent reckoning would reject as, to put it kindly, an incomplete 
picture. Even by the U.S. military’s own calculations, foreign fighters make up no more than, at 
most, 10 percent of all violent actors. 
Violent actors from outside Iraq are predominantly not from Iran and Syria. Consider this 
compilation[6] at the end of 2006: 
The 311 captured foreigners came from 27 different countries. The largest number came from 
Egypt (78), Syria (66), Sudan (41), Saudi Arabia (32), Jordan (17), Iran (13), Palestine (12), and 
Tunisia (10). Western countries were also represented. Two insurgents came from Great Britain 
and one came from the U.S., Denmark, Ireland and France. The countries that round out the list 
are: Algeria (8); Libya (7); Turkey (6); Lebanon (3); Qatar (2); UAE (2); India (2); Macedonia (1); 
Morocco (1); Somalia (1); Yemen (1); Israel (1); Indonesia (1); and Kuwait (1). 
In this list, then, no more than 25 percent are from Syria and Iran, and likely fewer since some 
who enter Iraq from Syria have Syrian papers but originate elsewhere. Other accounts have 
Syrian and Iranian numbers about the same, but Algerians far more prominent (which is an 
interesting sidebar to the Iraq story—i.e., that we can expect fighters from Iraq to appear in other 
conflicts in future years).[7] 
The financing for the violent groups, moreover, appears to be mainly self-generated (through theft 
and smuggling) or supplied by the likes of Saudi Arabia. Iran, doubtlessly, is also supplying 
money to Shia militias, but this is only one slice of a much larger pie. Weapons acquisitions and 
supply are also diverse—there has been no shortage of weapons in Iraq from the beginning of 
the war. 
The new wrinkle regionally is the increased activity of Kurdish rebels against both Iran and Turkey, 
terrorism that is harbored by the Kurdish entity in northern Iraq. The provincial government 
headed by Masoud Barzani pledges to curb the Kurdish rebels, but these assurances have been 
made before without being honored. There are concerns that the United States is turning a blind 
eye—or worse, giving support—to the rebels fighting Iran as part of a broader strategy to 
destabilize the Tehran regime. But what is known is already worrisome: Turkey’s blistering anger 
at Barzani’s duplicity and his obvious desire to declare an independent Kurdish state, with the 
rebels as accomplices. At the same time, the tumultuous status of Kirkuk, which is a contested, 
oil-rich governorate south of “Kurdistan” but which Barzani hopes to annex through a referendum, 
throws more fuel on this rising fire. Turkey has vowed to prevent such an annexation. 
Diplomacy and the Neighbors 
One of the principal recommendations of the Iraq Study Group was for the United States to 
involve the neighbors in trying to lower the sources of violence in Iraq and to promote stability. 
There has always been a question about what any of them could do to this end, apart from 
refraining from destabilizing activities. But the sensible notion that no peace was possible without 
the active support of the bordering states—a virtual truism of all peace agreements—naturally 
leads sensible people to implement an assertive diplomatic strategy that has yet to emanate from 
Foggy Bottom.[8] 
When the United States did agree to a regional forum last spring after initial coolness to the 
Baker-Hamilton report, it was widely regarded as an acknowledgement that the report was correct. 
The diplomacy has failed to materialize, however, as the rare interactions with Syria and Iran 
have devolved into blaming salvos without concrete steps resulting. If anything, U.S. actions 
toward the Islamic Republic are veering close to war. The ISG’s recommendation nonetheless 
remains valid, remaining one of the few plausible options for U.S. action that could yield progress. 
For Iran, the Iraq war is both an opportunity and a hazard. The opportunities are clear—an end to 
the lethal enemy, Saddam Hussein, and the rise of the Shia majority to power. The hazards are 
nonetheless real, particularly roiling instability and violence, refugees, continuing U.S. occupation 
and possibly permanent bases, and the rise of a rival Shia power. As a result, Iran is active in Iraq, 
as was expected. Its exact goals are not clear, although the humiliation of the United States and 
the departure of U.S. forces are surely atop their list, as is the consolidation of friendly Shia 
political figures in the central government and the southern governorates. 
Syrian interests are somewhat more difficult to fathom, given its long and bumptious history with 
the Ba’ath Party in Iraq, the colossal scale of the refugee crisis (nearly one million Iraqis now in 
Syria), and the ardent hope of driving a chastened United States out of the region. 
These interests, such as they are, appear to be so at odds with U.S. goals in Iraq that diplomacy 
does not look promising. But that is true only if Washington views Iraq as a long-term platform for 
U.S. military operations in the Gulf. A promise to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq and to reduce the 
U.S. presence in the region would potentially open diplomatic doors. Such a withdrawal, dicey 
though it may be, would seem to be the sine qua non for Iran and Syria to join with a regional 
forum to stabilize Iraq. Since withdrawal seems inevitable—it is timing and scale that remain in 
doubt—the offer of withdrawal should not be an obstacle. In fact, it is more the reaction of Saudi 
Arabia and Jordan to this prospect that is problematic: both may step up support for Sunni 
insurgent groups as a consequence of an American drawdown. The specter of violence, and 
orchestrated violence as a response, again appears as a decisive factor. 
That is all the more reason why a regional forum becomes a necessity. Bilateral diplomacy and 
coercion are obvious failures. But the United States is also caught in a dilemma: attracting Iran 
and Syria (and now, possibly, Turkey) into constructive dialogue probably means discussing post-
coalition security arrangements, i.e., discussions predicated on U.S., withdrawal. But that very 
condition may launch the Saudis, Jordanians (and possibly the Israelis) in a direction that keeps 
tensions high. Only a regional forum, where all players are at the table and a substantive set of 
objectives is the actual goal (rather than photo and accusation ops), has the chance to build 
mechanisms, obligations, and incentives for the neighbors to contribute to a solution. 
Violence and the Coalition 
Among the shadows and echoes that divert from a clearer understanding of the war is one largely 
neglected topic—the human cost of the war. A bizarrely narrow debate among defense analysts 
broke out shortly after Petraeus’ September testimony with regard to casualties, even as 
evidence of colossal human suffering was mounting. The echoes in the cave had civilian deaths 
at about 15,000-30,000 annually, when it is well established that such numbers are partial 
counts—partial in both meanings of the word. Three independent, household surveys estimate 
mortality from the war in the hundreds of thousands.[9] 
While controversial, these survey estimates are far more accurate than the morgue counts 
registered by the Sadrist Ministry of Health (when they deign to release numbers, which is rarely) 
or the Brookings Iraq Index and others who rely on the MoH. These survey numbers are derived 
from standard statistical methods and now have been repeated enough to suggest robustness. 
The method is “active surveillance”—going out and asking the question about death—rather than 
the “passive surveillance” of morgue reports, which cannot guess at what is not being reported. 
Hence, the gross underestimates of mortality in the news media and among some defense 
analysts. By not understanding the method of household surveys and relying instead on actual 
counting, which is incomplete to a degree no one knows, the defense establishment generally 
does not grasp the extent of the mayhem in Iraq, and therefore its implications. 
The mayhem is visible not only in the survey numbers, but in other metrics of suffering. At least 4 
million people have been displaced.[10] Oxfam reports that more than one million households are 
headed by widows, half from during the war. “Daily life for the average Iraqi civilian remains 
extremely precarious,” says the U.N. office in Iraq, in its October 2007 report. “Efforts by the 
Government of Iraq to find long-term and durable solutions for the mass displacement of the Iraqi 
population caused by the ongoing violence remained inadequate in the face of an ever-deepening 
humanitarian crisis. Having been forced to abandon their homes, many are living in dire 
conditions without access to adequate food supplies and basic services, with children being 
particularly vulnerable to disease.”[11] 
What this vast insecurity means for stability is not widely considered in the United States, but it 
certainly is in Iraq. Opinion surveys consistently show majority support for two related matters: 
first, the Iraqi public blames the U.S. military for most of the extraordinary levels of violence, and, 
second, they want the U.S. troops out of Iraq. 
In a major survey released in March 2007, for example, more than 80 percent of respondents 
said they witnessed violence; 53 percent said they knew someone injured or killed by violence. 
Fourteen percent said they had moved to avoid violence (which would translate to more than 3.5 
million Iraqis displaced but still in the country). “Asked whom they blame most for the current 
violence in Iraq, far and away the most common answer—voiced by four in 10 Iraqis—is either 
U.S. and coalition forces (31 percent), or George W. Bush personally (nine percent). Al Qaeda 
and foreign jihadi fighters are cited by 18 percent,” the survey revealed, and even larger 
numbers—78 percent overall—oppose the presence of U.S. troops: “More than seven in 10 
Shiites—and nearly all Sunni Arabs—think the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq is making security 
worse.”[12] Polls taken for the State Department and the University of Maryland’s Program on 
International Policy Attitudes in 2006 show similar results.[13] In a University of Michigan poll, one 
finding signals the wariness of Iraqis toward American motives: 76 percent thought the United 
States invaded to control oil; 41 percent to build U.S. military bases; 32 percent to help Israel.[14] 
In light of the mortality surveys, mounting poverty, and the numbers of displaced, these attitudes 
should come as no surprise. Altogether they comprise a very compelling case of U.S. 
miscalculation—dealing with the incipient, then mounting, insurgency harshly, with an 
accelerating cycle of violence the grim result—that has fueled violence across a broad swath of 
Iraq, among virtually all groups, and with unrelenting consequences. 
Those consequences have drawn in the neighbors to become active protectors of ethnic or 
sectarian kin, or, particularly in the case of Iran, to oppose a foreign occupation and protect its 
own interests in a country that has been a cruel rival for many years—call it Tehran’s Monroe 
Doctrine. The violence begun by the U.S. invasion and occupation remains the proximate cause 
for obstreperousness or foot-dragging by all neighbors. 
Much new thinking about Iraq in the independent panels, including the Baker-Hamilton group, 
hints at the need to reconsider the large U.S. deployments. The “surge” has reportedly brought 
down violence in Baghdad, but likely has, like a squeezed balloon, increased it elsewhere. And 
U.S. air strikes are up dramatically, by 400 percent this year, which are likely to increase civilian 
casualties and resentment. 
The main political strategy of the Administration—conceivably, the only strategy—is to divert 
attention to Iran and Syria and Osama bin Laden as the bad actors who are the root and branch 
of all Iraq’s woes. This shadow play obscures expert opinion here and abroad that agrees that 
any durable prospect for stability in Iraq must involve the neighbors through non-coercive 
diplomatic means, while reducing dramatically the U.S. “footprint” that is as much a spur to, as a 
hedge against, violence. But until we glimpse this harsh truth about the sources and 
consequences of violence, too many American elites, as Plato might say, will continue to fancy 
the shadows that they formerly saw as truer.  
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